On March 21st, 1918, the Germans launched their major Spring offensive. Unlike previous offensives by both sides, this one saw major advances in a single day, it was very unlike the previous “static” trench war.  My grandfather, along with some 21,000 other British soldiers, was captured that day.

Situation in late 1917 Reserves German Plan Operation Michael Map British Army Sherriff’s Journeys End Haig’s comments, 12 May 1918

An excellent book, and very readable, is Lyn Macdonald’s ‘To the Last Man, Spring 1918’. It not only gives an excellent account of the battle which, in her usual style, includes a tremendous number of accounts by men who were there on the day, both Allied and German. I have also included some pages of photos taken by Neil Hampson which show the area where the 2nd Battalion York and Lancs were fighting.  My thanks to Neil.

The situation, late 1917.

Until 1917 the German armies had been fighting a war on two fronts, in Belgium/France and against Russian forces in the east. As the situation in Russia changed with the move towards the October Revolution, the Allies realised that there would be an opportunity for the Germans to move forces from the Eastern to the Western Front.  As the Germans built up their forces there they would gain a position of numerical superiority and so be able to launch an offensive against the Allies.  At the same time the Americans were building up their strength in France, so the window for the expected German attack would be somewhere between the German build up, and the build up of American forces to the point where the Allies would have numerical superiority. Allied opinions varied as to when the best attack window would be for the Germans, but it was generally expected to be between February and May. The timing of the expected German attack was not the only issue taxing the Allied leaders and their senior commanders.  While the build up of American strength was progressing there were different views on how these new troops should be used; Pershing as American Commander was adamant that they would fight as an independent American force, the French and British would have preferred to use them as reserves to the British and French armies. The French wanted the British to move some of their units further south to take over some of the French line, the British were not keen on this and, at the same time Haig wanted extra reinforcements from the UK; Lloyd George did not agree.  While Haig was adamant that the Western Front was where the decisive battle should be fought against the Germans, there was another view that forces should be moved to Italy to distract the Germans there, others like Lloyd George wanted an offensive in Turkey to draw off German strength.  At the end of the day, the Western front would remain the focus of the Allied effort. On the 3rd December 1917 Haig summed up the situation for his Army commanders; “the general situation on the Russian and Italian fronts, combined with the paucity of reinforcements which we are likely to receive, will in all probability necessitate our adopting a defensive attitude for the next few months.  We must be prepared to meet a strong and sustained hostile offensive. It is therefore of first importance that Army commanders should give their immediate and personal attention to the organization of the zones for defensive purposes and to the rest and training of their troops.”

On the 7th January 1918 Haig was summoned to a meeting of the War Cabinet to give his view of the military situation over the next six to twelve months, according to the IWM Official History, Haig did not express himself well; “Having notoriously great difficulty in explaining himself verbally........his reply left the impression that he thought they [the Germans] would not venture to attack.”  However, two days later in a written reply he gave a very different view; “... the Central Powers may make a determined effort to force a decision on the Western Front.....Provision must be made to meet such an eventuality and to replace the losses which would certainly be incurred in withstanding a heavy and sustained attack”. As the Official History says; “The Prime Minister, not unnaturally, asked what could be thought of a man who now expressed an opinion totally different from that he had emitted two days before.”  There was no love lost between Lloyd George and Haig.

At a conference of Army Commanders held at Doullens on the 16th February, 1918 (PRO ref WO 95/2763) the situation was summed up and the following paragraphs have been taken from that document.

4. Will the Germans Attack?

The advertisement of the U-boat campaign, and the belittling of American intervention have both failed to raise German moral (sic). Failing a general peace in the Spring, the Germans will attempt to gain a decision before the weight of America can be felt in the field.  Intensive training for the attack bears this out.

5. The date of the Offensive.

Best date for the Germans is early May, when attacks could be threatened both in Flanders and in Italy. Germans will, however, probably be forced by food conditions and state of tension in Germany (produced by advertisement of coming offensive) to begin their attack in or before March.

6. Probable Theatre in which attack will be made.

If the Germans are forced to attack early, they will have to attack in the Western theatre. This is corroborated by the transfer of at least 5 out of 8 German divisions from Italy to West.

7. Probable points of attack.

If the Germans attack early, the main blow will probably be made against the French..... If the Germans deliver their main attack against the French, the CHAMPAGNE front is certainly the most probable sector. Indications from the British front are that no attack in strength in FLANDERS is possible at the moment, and that there are at present no signs of any big offensive being imminent on the rest of the British front. [The Battalion history for 2nd York & Lancs says that there had been rumours since early February that the Germans were massing in front of the British and preparing for an offensive] The possibility of a small attack on our First Army front is indicated by artillery registration and forward gun positions. It would be unwise to disregard the tempting objective formed by our transport deficiencies in the devastated area.

8. Probable Strength and Nature of Attack.

According to our standards for the offensive, the Germans have enough artillery to attack on a 30 mile front, but as they are almost certain to attempt a surprise, this front may be extended. Reports indicate that the surprise attack will be preceded by a bombardment of artillery positions with shell containing new gas, which will force masks off and so render troops liable to effects of a lethal gas.  Tanks will probably be used.  German infantry under training are being taught that a rapid-breakthrough is possible, and they will probably give excellent targets by advancing in dense formation. [That is not how it turned out]

Reserves

The British army was stretched in terms of manpower, Haig wanted more men but his requests had been refused. To try to bolster up depleted battalions, many of them had been disbanded [see below] and the men then sent to other units to increase their strength, this had happened to the 10th Battalion York & Lancs with many of the men going to the 2nd Battalion, like my Grandfather. A knock-on effect of the manpower problem was the lack of reserve divisions available to Haig; when the battle started he had only 8 divisions in general reserve to cover a front of 126 miles.  To quote the Official History; “.. a truly alarming situation. .... The smallness of the general reserve was indeed very disquieting, for only by throwing in fresh divisions can a commander influence a battle.”  The Official History also records another wrong appreciation by the commanders; “Both G.H.Q. and G.Q.G., judging from previous experience, anticipated that a German offensive, even if successful on a large scale, would do no more than occasion a more or less gradual withdrawal of the troops on the front attacked [we will see later that this is not how it happened], which would allow time for the Allied reserves to be brought up and assembled at a safe distance behind the front, and sent into action deliberately in accordance with the prearranged plan.  This anticipation was to be falsified on the Fifth Army front.”  Haig commented on the situation of the Reserves in a report written shortly after the battle.

At the Doullens conference mentioned above the report produced also had a paragraph on reserves.

(x)(a) Economy of Reserves.

This is one of the first essentials for the successful conduct of a defensive battle.  We must be prepared for a prolonged struggle; our resources must therefore be conserved. Whole formations should be maintained in reserve as long as possible, not only to avoid unnecessary losses in the early encounters, but also in order that the defense may be elastic and capable of meeting unforeseen situations. Army commanders should aim at retaining a sufficient reserve in their own hands to influence the fight and should not depend entirely upon G.H.Q. Reserves for this purpose.”

With the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in October 1917 and the subsequent signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty on 3rd March 1918, the Germans would transfer troops from the Eastern to the Western Front.  The number of German divisions in the west grew from 150 in November 1917 to 192 by the end of March 1918.

As more information became available to the Allies they realised that an attack was being prepared by the Germans, and at a subsequent commanders meeting in Doullens, 2nd March 1918 the record (WO 95/2763) says;

The Commander-in-Chief drew attention to the following points:-

1. Preparations for the Defensive Battle.

In view of the fact that we have now definite indications of an imminent attack on the fronts of the Fifth and Third Armies, it is necessary to consider carefully whether every possible precaution has been taken to ensure success in the coming battle:-

All commanders should satisfy themselves that their dispositions are those best calculated to meet and defeat the enemy’s offensive. If any further preparatory measures are considered necessary, they should be put into execution at once. ... The coming battle may develop into a protracted struggle, and all Commanders must take this possibility into consideration in formulating their plans.  They should decide which features it is essential for them to retain, and not waste men by attempting to regain ground which is of no tactical importance.”

The British now knew that they were to face a large offensive, but they were not properly prepared to meet the tactics that the Germans would use, their ‘Storm Troop’ tactics and the poor visibility on the day of the attack would cause severe problems for the British defenders.

The German Plan

Ludendorff’s “Operation Michael” was one of five options prepared following a conference at Mons in late December, 1917. On 21st January, 1918, Ludendorff chose “Michael” from these five, it would involve three armies attacking the British on a front of 50 miles.  At that time the British held a front of 126 miles out of a total Allied front line of 468 miles.  The northern 1/3 of the German attack would fall on part of the Third Army (General Sir J. Byng), the southern 2/3 of the attack would be against the British Fifth Army (General Sir H. Gough).

The broad scope of Operation Michael

The Second German Army under General der Kavallerie Georg von der Marwitz would attack in the centre, aiming for Peronne, to encircle Byng’s Flesquieres Salient from the south. To the north of Marwitz was the Seventeenth Army commanded by General der Infanterie Otto von Below, his army would link up with the Second Army and march on Bapaume. The southern end of the attack was to be delivered by the Eighteenth Army of General der Infanterie Oskar von Hutier, their advance was to be towards Ham on the Somme and prevent French involvement from the south. The Germans would employ new Storm Troop tactics that would allow rapid advance, and cause confusion in the British lines. Ludendorff hoped that the Germans could capitalise on achievements they had had away from the Western Front, at Riga, Caporetto and then at Cambrai. In these actions they had employed the tactics which had been part of the new training regime for the German army; the use of Storm Troops and Assault units.  In all three of these cases the Germans had achieved breakthoughs, but not necessarily with the required follow-up.  Ludendorf hoped that with Operation Michael they would achieve the required follow-up, he wanted to see the British Forward Zones and the Battle Zones overrun, with the infantry getting right up to the British artillery lines. Luckily for the British the Germans were not as successful as they had hoped to be, the Battle Zones in most places did not fall until the third day and by April 5th Ludendorff accepted that the attack had been stopped by the British.

Map  The map shows the position of 6th Division, with the 195th German Division facing them. Click on their position to go to the trench map.

British Army

The British Third and Fifth Armies were under strength in early 1918.  Divisions which should have had a strength of some 12,000 men could only muster around 6,000. On the 1st March the infantry element of Haig’s armies was a little over half a million men, 36% of total strength as compared to 45% only six months earlier. To rectify the situation of Divisional strength it was decided that divisions would consist of 9 battalions not 12, and that many battalions would be amalgamated , some would be disbanded. Battalions would again have a strength of around 1,000 men. The 10th Battalion York and Lancs was one of those disbanded and absorbed into the 2nd Battalion, my grandfather going with them. The men from the 10th joined those of the 2nd Battalion at Fremicourt on 7th February, 1918; eleven officers and two hundred and twenty-one other ranks.

Haig had asked for more men as reinforcements because he still believed in a British offensive in Flanders. Lloyd George did not have the same belief and so the troops were not forthcoming, although there were over 600,000 men trained and available in England.  Martin Middlebrook says “It was these men that Haig was asking for when he told the War Cabinet of his future plans, but Lloyd George had had enough of offensives and, to stop Haig, he simply kept the reinforcements back at home.” Haig’s situation was further worsened by Lloyd George having agreed that the British line should be extended to the south to take over some of the French sector. That was why Gough’s army had a front of 42 miles to defend against the German attack, while the Third Army had only 28 miles.

The British had had many indications that an attack was imminent, many of these coming from captured German prisoners, but they did not know where it would land.  Although the Germans had had to move a vast number of men and guns into position, they had done this largely unobserved by the British.  To quote the 2nd Battalion history “Early in February rumours began to gain ground that the Germans were massing troops in front of the British and preparing for an offensive.” The 1st Battalion, King’s Shropshire Light Infantry were on the left of the 2nd York & Lancs, and the expectation of an attack is mentioned in their War Diary;

14th: Unusual enemy activity reported and the Battalion ‘stood to’ from 4 to 8 am at Battle Positions, but nothing occurred.

15th: Quiet day in the line but considerable uneasiness by the Staff as to enemy’s intention to attack.

For each succeeding day up to and including the 20th the daily diary entry begins “Uneasiness continues”, then on the 21st; “Desperate enemy offensive commences....”

I should point out here that initially it is not my intention to cover the whole scope of the German offensive launched on the 21st March, and the British reaction to it.  I will limit myself to the area around the 6th Division, who were relieved by the 41st Division around midnight on the 22nd March. However, the scope may well expand with time!

Journey’s End, by R.C. Sherriff

Sherriff served as a Captain in the East Surrey regiment, joining up shortly after the outbreak of the war. In 1928 his play, Journey’s End was given a Sunday evening performance, with Laurence Olivier playing the lead role of Captain Stanhope.  The play is set in the British front line near St Quentin and covers the evening of the 18th March when his Company move into the trenches, until the start of the battle on the 21st. I read it many years ago at school, but have enjoyed re-reading it recently.  I have used extracts from the play on the following pages and have highlighted them in red so that you will know the source.

Haig’s comments after the battle.

Following the German breakthrough, especially on 5th Army front, Haig wrote a report on 12th May 1918 (PRO ref WO32/5097) with some comments on reserves.

3. Having thus broken through our organized defensive system the ample reserves at the disposal of the Germans added to their superior leadership and tactical training in open warfare enabled them to exploit their success to the full.  In consequence they were able to push forward so rapidly that the pre-arranged scheme for the intervention of French reserves had no time to mature.

4. We must accept the fact that these conditions may recur.  It would seem therefore that it is undesirable to leave any considerable portion of the front on which attack is probable and where ground can not be given up without a definite proportion of reserves close enough up to intervene on the first day.  This proportion should not be less than 1 Division to every 5 miles of front and should be stationed within 6 or 7 miles of the front. These considerations should be borne in mind in any discussions as to the respective lengths of line to be held by the French and British Armies.