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Because the original intent behind the move on the Dardanelles had not envisaged major Army landings, insufficient thought had been given to the command and control of a joint operation. On top of this the forces available in the area were not of the requisite strength, and Lemnos had not been sufficiently provisioned to cope with the number of men who would be involved. As a result Sir Ian Hamilton left the area for Alexandria to organise his forces, intending to return in mid-April.
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Sir Ian Hamilton
had been appointed to lead the operation on the 13th March. General Sir Horace Smith-Dorien commanded II Corps on the Western Front in 1914, but in 1900 in South Africa he came under the orders of Hamilton during the Boer War. He said of Hamilton “He was a delightful leader to follow, always definite and clear in his instructions, always ready to listen and willing to adopt suggestions, and, what is more important, always ready to go for the enemy and extremely quick at seizing a tactical advantage, and, with it all, always in a good temper.”
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Others have described him differently for his command at Gallipoli; fearless, sensitive, lacking the required degree of ruthfulness, “essentially a weak commander given a
task beyond his abilities and resources.” At the same time Lieutenant-General Sir William Birdwood who had control of the Australian and New Zealand forces, under Hamilton, was an excellent leader
and commander. As in other battles during this war, the quality of many of the commanders would not match up to the bravery of the soldiers on the ground.
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After the decision had been taken to extend the operation it was essential that there be sufficient forces to carry it out.
In a heated War Council discussion of February 24th and 26th, Churchill the dispatch of the 29th Division to Gallipoli, but Kitchener disagreed and carried the Council. Kitchener believed that the 33,000 men available to General Birdwood in Egypt would be sufficient, however by March 16th he had agreed on the need for the 29th Division, but by then 3 weeks had been lost.
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The plan for the landings
was to have the French attack Kum Kale on the Asiatic side, and the Royal Naval Division attack at Bulair. These were to be diversionary landings, and the forces involved would be moved to the main area of operations once the main landings had succeeded. The primary landings would be the Australian and New Zealand Divisions at Ari Burnu (ANZAC Cove) and the 29th Division would be spread over five beaches (S, V, W, X & Y) around Cape Helles. The objectives for the landings were (Dardanelles
Commission);
“At Anzac the force which landed first, called the covering force, after it had
overcome any resistance at or near the shore which the Turks might offer, was to occupy the Sari Bahr heights and thus cover the left flank of the force, called the main body, which was to land shortly
afterwards. This body was to advance four miles east of the landing-place and assault Mal Tepe, a hill overlooking the Straits and three-quarters of a mile south of Boghali.
At Helles the troops were similarly divided into a covering force and main body,
and after overcoming any resistance at or near the shore which the Turks might offer, they were to occupy Krithia and Achi Baba.
When the Anzac and Helles forces had established themselves at Mal Tepe and Achi
Baba, the intention was that a converging attack should be made from those points upon the Turkish position at Kilid Bahr.”
The Commission went on to say; “As the Turkish resistance near the
shore proved too strong at Anzac and Helles, the proposed advance inland to Sari Bahr, Mal Tepe, Krithia and Achi Baba did not take place.”
The landings were scheduled for dawn on Sunday 25th April.
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The picture on the right is from the June 17th, 1915 edition of The War Budget
Illustrated (3 old pence weekly) and was headlined “What the “Lizzie” did to Seddul Bahr”.
Under the photo it said “This striking photograph, one of the first of the
official pictures circulated on behalf of the Press Bureau, shows a corner of the massive wall surrounding the fortress of Seddul Bahr after the bombardment by the Queen Elizabeth and other vessels of
the Allies.”
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ANZAC Cove.
The Australian and New Zealand forces did not land on “Z” beach as intended, but about a mile further north at Ari Burnu. While all the forces were put ashore fairly quickly they were now opposed by the Turkish 19th Division under Mustafa Kemal, who took the high ground of Sari Bair and Chunuk Bair, denying them to the Anzac forces.
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The landing beaches around Cape Helles. Anzac is a few miles north of “X” beach.
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Y beach.
These landings met little opposition, but through poor co-ordination they did not attempt to assist other landings, and did not move inland to take the high ground. As a result of all the confusion these forces were later taken off the beach.
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X beach. These landings also met little opposition and did attempt to assist those at “W” beach, but did not succeed until night-fall.
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W beach.
The landings by the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers at W beach was a very different story. Heavily defended and with wire to overcome they won “six VCs before breakfast” in the words of Hamilton. It became known as Lancashire Landing.
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V beach.
Here the troops were to go ashore after beaching the collier that had transported them, the River Clyde, seen in many of the old photos of the landings. At 6.30 a.m. the fire from the Turkish positions was such that all aboard did not get off until darkness fell.
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S beach. These landings went well, and by 10 a.m. they had captured the main defences.
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The “Trojan Horse” as the River Clyde was
called. Unloading at V beach. Photos from “The War Budget”.
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After the landings some 30,000 men had been put ashore, some against fierce opposition and with severe losses. Because of confusion and poor organization the forces
on “Y” beach were evacuated on the 26th April. The only real leadership and control had come from Birdwood who had gone ashore with his Anzac troops. Hamilton stayed on board the battleship
Queen Elizabeth from where he had little information of the situation on the ground.
Because of the naval errors which had caused Birdwood’s troops to be put ashore in the wrong position they were penned in to a poor position, low on food and water. Birdwood’s subordinates had advised withdrawal, but Hamilton refused. Birdwood was told that Hunter-Weston’s attack would relieve the pressure on the Anzac’s, if and when it came.
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