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On the 14th October 1975 Vulcan XM645 crashed after hitting the undershoot of runway 24 at Luqa on Malta. As a result of the crash the three rear crew as well as two ground crew who were occupying the 6th & 7th ‘seats’ in the rear, were killed as they were unable to vacate the aircraft. The two pilots ejected and survived. The following account of the incident is taken from the file in the National Archives at Kew, AIR 20/12628.
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The accident came at the end of a transit flight from RAF Waddington to Luqa; the flight itself was uneventful. As has been mentioned elsewhere on the site, overseas flights were an essential part of crew training, allowing crews to fly low level routes that they were not familiar with, and operating in a different environment to that back home. When going away the crew would often stow their personal kit and suitcases either in the panniers in the bomb bay, or in the nose section of the crew compartment, in the prone bomb aimer’s position. However, this is also where the crew entrance ladder should be stowed by the Nav Radar after the crew are aboard and the entrance door is closed. This point will be commented on again later in the report.
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Vulcan crews fly as ‘constituted’ crews. They train together and gain their operational rating as a crew rather than as individuals. If a crew member is unavailable to fly then permission has to be gained for an alternative aircrew member to fill the position, the crew is then reconstituted with the new member. The original co-pilot was not able to take part in the planned Malta ‘ranger’ as his wife was about to have a baby, so the crew was reconstituted with a different co-pilot. It may be significant in reviewing some of the Captain’s decisions to remember that this was not the co-pilot he was used to flying with.
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In 1974, a year before the accident, our crew had flown to Malta as part of a 101 Squadron detachment, it was a fairly common occurrence for crews to go there either as a ‘Lone Ranger’ or as part of a larger detachment. As you approach runway 24 there is a large Nimrod hangar to the right of the threshold, this can produce disturbing winds at the final point of the approach. We found that all the crews on the detachment had problems with their first approach, a number of them taking two or three goes before putting it down. The ground crew were standing with scoreboards, holding them up for the crews to see as if they were judging ice skating. I would be surprised if this crew were completely unaware of the possibility of these possible problems before takeoff from Waddington.
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In 1975 the runway at Luqa was a ‘short’ runway of some 7,800 feet, and also narrower than the runway at Waddington. This causes a little visual confusion for the pilot on final approach as the runway aspect is different to that he is used to with a normal length runway, it can cause you to believe that you are higher than you actually are. Also, the runway, and the undershoot to the runway, slope upwards, which again can cause a pilot to go lower on the final approach than normal.
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The file has a note from an Air Investigator where he estimated that from marks on the undershoot about 10 aircraft had landed short, one of them had tyre marks superimposed on those left by XM645. Following the incident a signal was sent out to stations to say that “considerable uphill gradient on the approach … can give the false impression to a pilot that his glidepath angle is too high. … pilots can be deceived into landing short on RW24.”
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At the crew briefing before take-off the Captain briefed the co-pilot to make the first approach into Malta using ILS, with himself obviously monitoring that approach, he also stipulated that the intent should be not to ‘stream’ the braking ‘chute. The Board of Inquiry would criticise the Captain for his decision to allow the co-pilot to make the first approach, they did not think this ‘prudent’, they also felt that he gave an inadequate briefing to the co-pilot on the issues involved in landing on a short runway, and the slope of the ground. They felt that these items and the decision not to allow the chute to be ‘streamed’ all put undue pressure on the co-pilot for this first approach with a Captain he was not familiar with.
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As stated previously the transit from Waddington was uneventful and the co-pilot settled in to his ILS approach to Luqa. The Captain however made another change that does not appear to have been part of the pre-flight briefing. The co-pilot was requested to convert from instrument to visual approach at 400 ft. AGL and the Captain also asked him to go from a 30 glide-path to a 2 ˝ 0 glide-path. The visual approach would use the Visual Approach Slope Indicators (VASI) at the threshold end of the runway. These can be seen in the attached graphic from a flight simulator program. The VASI system uses lights and lenses which when seen from the cockpit of an approaching aircraft will produce a different lighting effect. If they are set for a 30 approach, as at Luqa then, as in the graphic, they produce a “red-white” set meaning “on glide slope”. For a 2 ˝ 0 the setup would appear as “red-pink” which would indicate “below the ILS glide slope, but still safe”. When the VASI goes “red-red” it means that the approach is too low and corrective action should be taken.
The image below is from the web and shows a flight simulator view of a VC10 approach, the VASI can be seen “red white” on this approach.
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David Hall emailed me with the following comments on VASI.
I have a comment about your depiction of VASIs, using the VC10 sim picture (co-oincidentally I am a VC10 pilot at Brize Norton).
The description of VASIs is correct but your screenshot depicts PAPIs - a different system.
VASIs have a row of 2 lights and then 2 more about 20 feet further up the runway. "Red over white" mean that the lights further away are red and the nearer are white (3 degrees).
PAPIs are 4 lights in a row, often with an identical row on the other side of the runway. Each individal light has a different setting such that 4 whites = high, 3 whites/1red = above slope, 2 reds/2 whites = on glideslope, 3 reds/1 white =below slope, 4 reds = too low. The on-slope condition is usually set at 3-degrees but can be 2.5 at some military airfields.
A 2.5-degree slope can be flown on PAPIs set for 3-degrees by aiming for 3 reds/1 white. This is a much easier technique than trying to fly 2.5-degrees on VASIs by making the bottom lights pink. There is actually no pink setting - it is simply the reds just starting to take over from the whites as the aircraft slips below a 3-degree slope and it very much depends on judgement as to when the lights are pink and not red. PAPIs are much safer because it is very clear when 3 reds/1white becomes 4 reds.
I don't know what the standard fit on RAF airfields was in the mid-70s, but ever since I have been flying (mid 80s) the RAF has had PAPIs not VASIs. In my experience as an instructor a new co-pilot would be unfamilair with VASIs and asking him to change the approach angle using VASIs would be very demanding, and certainly contributed to this sad accident.
I replied to David that I only remember VASI in relation to the Vulcan; any Vulcan pilots care to comment?
Since the mail from David I have had another (21 June 08) from Andy Shaw (Sqn Ldr) who was a co-pilot/captain on Vulcans from 1974-81. Andy says that they would have been VASIs and that the co-pilot, who Andy remembers as relatively experienced, would have ‘grown up’ with VASIs
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The Board of Inquiry were told that the co-pilot was conscious that when he had attempted a previous “red-pink” approach he had been too high, so would need to go lower to hold the correct glide slope. The Board felt that this and his knowledge that he should not use the brake ‘chute was another contributory cause to the accident. The Board felt that the evidence from the two pilots in regard to heights at which actions were taken during the descent was at variance, and unreliable, there is also a comment that the Captain was in obvious distress giving his evidence.
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The co-pilot, in the latter phase of the descent, selected high-drag airbrake but was then, in the opinion of the Board, late in applying power to correct the increased rate of descent which would have resulted from the airbrake selection. It was their view that he had maintained aircraft speed by changing aircraft attitude rather than by the selection of increased engine power. In the descent he had set 68% power. Late in the descent the Captain had noticed from the Rate of Climb and Descent Indicator (RCDI) that they did indeed have an excessive rate of descent. The Captain then took control, took the engines to 100% and pushed forward on the control column; all of these effectively at the same time. The co-pilot believed this happened at between 100 – 150 ft. AGL, not 350 ft. as the Captain claimed. The Board then went into considerable analysis of a series of four photos taken by Godfrey Mangion, an aircraft and photo enthusiast, which were taken of XM645 very close to the threshold. From these photos and the way they show the changing aircraft attitude and control surface positions, the Board determined that the power up and nose down commanded by the Captain, took place about 1.3 seconds before impact, at a height of only some 20 ft. AGL. From 68% power the engines take some 2 seconds to ‘spool up’ to 100%, too late in this situation. There were a number of people on the ground who heard the distinctive sound of the emergency power up, and they believed the aircraft was close to the ground at the time.
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Both of the photos below were taken by Godfrey Mangion, there is a series of 4 photos of XM645 just prior to hitting the runway in the file at Kew, all taken by GM.
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XM645 at the point described above, 20 ft. AGL.
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XM645 explodes.
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The aircraft hit the undershoot with sufficient force to sheer off the undercarriage, the aircraft bounced back into the air some 20 feet or so, it then hit the runway again some 600 feet after the impact before climbing away again with the Captain attempting to do a circuit and land. On the downwind leg fire broke out on the starboard wing, which was confirmed by the AEO using his periscope, as a consequence of the incident at least one alternator was lost at this point and non-essential electrical loads were shed, hydraulic pressure dropped to zero but other indications were ‘normal’.
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The following table is a transcript of the last communication between the crew and the Tower at Luqa. You can see that while handling the emergency the crew kepr changing their callsign; at times Mike Bravo Romeo India Fox, at others Mike India Fox, then just India Fox, and at times reverting to Rafair 806 or just 806.
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MIF
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We’ve had a heavy landing and – er- going round again.
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TWR
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MIF Roger. Be advised, you have lost your sta – port undercarriage which is on the runway and don’t know whether you are on fire or not. Will you check.
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TWR
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IF confirm that your starboard engine is OK
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MBRIF
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Mayday, Mayday, Mayday. This is MBRIF, MBRIF, MBRIF, fire in starboard wing.
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MBRIF
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MIF do you read? Luqa MIF.
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TWR
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MIF Roger copied. Everything prepared for emergency landing and how long can you orbit for?
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MBRIF
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IF, standby.
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Rafair 806
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Rafair 806 are you aware that aircraft is on fire?
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Rafair 806
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Luqa Tower 806
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TWR
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806, go ahead.
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Rafair 806
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Are you aware that aircraft is on fire
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TWR
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806 affirmative. Everything is under control
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Rafair
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806
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TWR
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MIF, can you pass me any further intentions?
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At that point the pilots must have been close to ejection and the aircraft crashing.
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The following is a description of the way in which the aircraft lost its structural integrity, and crashed. It is part of an interim report in the PRO file.
The breaking of the outer engine rib and the associated damage during the landing would have seriously reduced the rigidity of the wing. During the development of the fire the strength of the rear spar was affected to the extent that the front spar was the only effective load carrying member of the wing. Under these conditions it is likely that the wing would separate under normal flight loads with a combination of torsional and bending loads and the failure of the front spar was consistent with this. The separation of the wing would allow the right main gear and the No. 4 engine to drop from the airframe, and the separation of the fin and rudder and rear fuselage would be expected to follow as a result of the violent rolling and yawing manoeuvres following the wing detachment.
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Part of the investigation report includes an Emergency Incident Report which gives some detail of the activity prior to ejection:-
Air Traffic, as mentioned above, advised the pilot that part of his main undercarriage had remained on the runway, the Captain advised the crew that they should “ prepare to abandon” the aircraft. The Nav Plotter responded by asking the Captain if the nose wheel was down. This is very relevant for the rear crew as their exit is to slide down the crew door in the floor of the rear cabin, but this leads straight to the whole nose wheel oleo assembly which the rear crew have to try to avoid. I have some detail on this in another section. In the case of 645, the nose wheel had remained down since the attempted landing, so would be a problem for the rear crew. The problem was increased because there were five rear crew positions filled rather than the normal three and with the aircraft at circuit height, escape would be questionable.
The co-pilot responded to the Plotter’s question by trying, unsuccessfully to raise the wheels, not surprisingly they did not come up. The main wheels were on the runway and as they had been ripped off the whole hydraulic system was compromised; the Captain drew the attention of the co-pilot to the hydraulic gauges which showed zero hydraulic pressure. About this time the Captain called “abandon!” three times to the crew, there was then an explosion. Following the explosion the Captain called “get out!” three times, he then reported that he felt a pressure change which he felt was the rear door opening and he also said that he saw the rear door light illuminate.
At this point it would be an understatement to say that the aircraft situation was dire, apart from the obvious emergency there had been an explosion and the aircraft was close to the ground, probably too close for a safe exit by the rear crew. Although the Captain says he had indications of the crew door opening (pressure change and illuminated indicator light) the report does not say that the door opened although it does say that the operating handle had been pulled. However, there was a problem with the crew entrance ladder. At the beginning I mentioned that the correct procedure was to stow the ladder in the prone bomb aimer position in the nose of the crew compartment, but that area was full of personal kit for the period away from base. It seems highly likely that the ladder was still on the crew door, but possibly upside down. After the accident the ladder was found embedded in the crew door, upside down and if it had been in the vicinity of the door during the accident it is quite possible that it could have impeded the opening of the door. The Board said that “no conclusion can be reached as to the position of the ladder at the time the door was opened in view of the gyrations of the aircraft following wing separation.” Certainly, if it was in the region of the door it may well have jammed it, and it would not have been possible to slide down the door with the ladder there if it had opened, although it could have been jettisoned through the open door, if it had opened. With the ‘G’ forces on the aircraft while it was breaking up, and with five people in the rear cabin instead of three, it is highly unlikely that if the door had been opened that the rear crew could have exited in under 30 seconds, especially with the nose wheel down. An exit was impossible.
Immediately after believing that the rear crew door had opened, the two pilots ejected, co-pilot first. It must have been a terrible call for the Captain to make, but he and the co-pilot could no longer save the aircraft, and had to save themselves. The ejection height was low as the Captain had not separated from his seat when it hit the ground. The aircraft probably crashed only seconds after the ejection. The Board believed that the starboard wing had parted from the aircraft about 4 minutes after the initial impact on the runway undershoot. All the rear crew were killed instantly on impact, the Navigator Radar Flt. Lt. Stan Lambert, had been my instructor on the radar either at Lindholme or the OCU.
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Summing up then the Board had a number of criticisms.
- It had not been prudent to plan for the co-pilot to do the first approach at Luqa.
- The Captain had given an inadequate briefing to the co-pilot on the problems of landing on a short runway, especially one with a slope.
- The first approach had been made more problematic for the co-pilot by the requirement to change the glide slope angle from breakoff height, and the restriction on using the brake ‘chute.
- The Captain’s recognition of the high rate of descent had been too late on the approach to allow a recovery and his action on recovery had probably increased the force on the undercarriage.
- The Captain was found to have been negligent in his handling of the aircraft.
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Unfortunately it is not possible to see this other than as an avoidable accident in which a serviceable aircraft was flown into the ground, killing all rear crew members.
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The following is Godfrey Mangion’s description of the events as he saw them that day.
It was Tuesday 14 October 1975, a fine sunny day and as usual when some spare time is available, I collect my photographic gear and head for Luqa airport, to photograph aircraft landing and taking-off. I was at my favorite spot (threshold runway 24) at about 9.00 a.m. cameras and telephotos ready for use, so was my airband radio tuned on approach frequency. As regards to aircraft movements it was quite a successful morning, having shot 4 F4 Phantoms, 2 Hercules, 6 Nimrods, 6 Canberras and 3 civil airliners.
At about 12.30 hours I caught a call sign on my radio which indicated that a Vulcan aircraft was some 100 miles away inbound to Luqa for a landing on runway 24. Some 15 minutes later the Vulcan was in sight so I took position with my camera to photograph the landing, which seemed as normal as the many other Vulcans I photographed before. I photographed the aircraft as soon as it filled my viewfinder frame, and took a succession of 4 photos of the last seconds before touchdown.
After this the aircraft sunk heavily and made a rough contact with the runway, so rough that the right undercarriage did not withstand the aircraft's weight and departed the aircraft. The aircraft slid on its belly for some time damaging its undersides, at this very time I heard the roar of the aircraft’s 4 Olympus jet engines, which however meant that the pilot decided to take-off again. Indeed he did, also leaving his port undercarriage on the runway.
On the radio I heard the air traffic controller advising the pilot about his undercarriage state, and also that the aircraft was on fire, the pilot replied that he was doing a circuit to crash land on runway 24 after it was covered with fire prevention foam. As the aircraft was turning inbound for the landing it exploded in mid air over Zabbar Village, killing 5 of its 7-crew members. Large pieces of the aircraft fell on the populated village of Zabbar, miraculously with very low casualties, one woman who was shopping in a street was hit by the burning debris and was killed instantly, and some 20 others were injured slightly. The pilot and navigator escaped death by using their ejector seats (ejector seats are only provided for the pilot and navigator in the Vulcan). [This is incorrect, Godfrey means the Pilot and Co-pilot have ejector seats. J Dillon]
I managed to photograph the aircraft exploding from Luqa with a 200mm telephoto lens; these photos were published in the local press and in the Daily Mail in the U.K. the next morning.
The aircraft involved in the crash was Vulcan B. 2, XM645 of No.9 Squadron RAF Wadington, and for photographic buffs the photos were taken with a Pentax Spotomatic SLR Camera with a 135mm lens for the landing shots, and a 200mm lens for the explosion shots
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